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INTRODUCTION 
 
Climate change and the resulting melting of the ice cap in 
the Arctic have opened up new opportunities for those seeking to 
exploit natural resources. In what increasingly resembles a race 
against time comparable to the notorious gold rush, States, 
multinationals and smaller players alike are trying to get a grip 
on one of the last unexploited regions of the world. Estimates of 
oil, gas and minerals coupled to the concern about energy 
shortages at the global level make this region the last frontier or 
the new Eldorado. The exploitation of these resources is highly 
controversial because it will not only increase the impact of 
global warming but will also affect the situation of indigenous 
communities living in the region. The human impact and 
environmental transformation of the Arctic increasingly affect 
the habitat of indigenous communities and threaten their cultural 
and economic survival.
4
 While some indigenous communities 
participate in the exploitation of natural resources of the Arctic, 
this does not guarantee that their rights and traditional way of 
life are recognized and respected in practice. Tensions are 
consequently growing between indigenous peoples and the 
Arctic States when it comes to the governance and management 
of natural resources.   
For thousands of years, northern indigenous communities 
have prospered in a region so often considered by others as a 
land of discovery or a wilderness mostly devoid of permanent 
human settlements due to a hostile environment. From the 16
th
 to 
the 19
th
 century, newcomers have nevertheless been able to settle 
and shifted the power balance in their favor by ‘colonizing’ 
indigenous lands and appropriating themselves important parcels 
of natural resources to exploit.
5
 This process was accompanied 
by the extension of western sovereignties over these northern 
territories and the appropriation of Arctic resources by whalers, 
                                                                
4  MARK NUTTAL, PIPELINE DREAMS: PEOPLE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE 
ARCTIC ENERGY FRONTIER 13-19 (2011). 
5  Else Grete Broaderstad, Political Systems, in ARTIC HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 85, 86-88 (2004). 
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explorers, fishermen, fur traders and not to forget today’s 
entrepreneurs of the extractive industries. Moreover, a policy of 
assimilation of indigenous peoples was implemented all over the 
circumpolar region as a main strategy of the Arctic States in their 
nation-building process.
6
 In North Fennoscandia, the process 
started with the implementation of fiscal and territorial policies 
in Saami territory. The policy objective was to strengthen State 
sovereignty over the north and resulted in the majority of Saami 
territory becoming State-owned land.
7
 In addition, the 
colonization process imposed new State borders on Saami 
territory. As a consequence, the Saami peoples are now divided 
among four countries: Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia.  
The legacy of the Arctic colonization remains present today 
with the sovereign rights of western States to govern and manage 
natural resources in the region. In particular, the exercise of State 
sovereignty perpetuates the colonization process by undermining 
indigenous self-determination in their control of lands and 
natural resources. Even though States may permit some transfer 
of authority to local governments, this does not remove the State 
centred orientation of governance in matters relating to the 
development of land and natural resources. Thus, as long as 
development plans affecting the Arctic do not fully benefit the 
indigenous communities, but threaten their environment as well 
as their way of life, indigenous self-determination will not be 
realized. For this reason, there is an urgent need to re-assert 
indigenous rights to control natural resources so as to ensure that 
their interests prevail in the development process of the Arctic 
region. 
This article defends the view that the international human 
rights corpus gives an adequate framework to achieve this goal. 
It advocates for indigenous self-determination as a means for its 
beneficiaries to control their traditional lands and resources. The 
article starts by describing the governance of natural resources 
under traditional international law and applies the doctrine of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources as it is generally 
understood to the Arctic. It will be shown that Arctic governance 
                                                                
6 Id. 
7 Roger Kvist, The Racist Legacy in Modern Swedish Saami Policy, 14 
CAN. J. NATIVE STUD. 203, 209 (1994).  
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does not fundamentally differ from the governance models 
developed elsewhere; it is equally embedded in a State centred 
vision of governance when it comes to matters relating to natural 
resources. This privileges the dominance of States and prioritizes 
their interests to the detriment of indigenous peoples’ demands. 
In a second phase, the article will link the doctrine of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources to self-determination and will 
show that they are connected to one another. The concept of 
sovereignty will be approached from the perspective of human 
rights. From this standpoint, it will be argued that sovereignty 
implies the duty of a State to protect and respect the right of 
peoples to dispose of their natural resources. As a final note, the 
article takes a short look at the developments that have emerged 
in Norway, Finland and Sweden regarding the accommodation 
of Saami self-determination and appraises the steps taken to 
integrate indigenous rights within the governance of natural 
resources in this context.    
 
I. PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES 
FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF TRADITIONAL 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. Interstate Relations and the Delimitation of State 
Sovereignty in the Arctic 
 
From the perspective of international law, the Arctic region 
includes the Arctic Ocean and parts of the territory of Canada, 
Denmark (Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway (Svalbard), the 
Russian Federation, Sweden and the USA (Alaska). The region 
is rich in natural resources such as petroleum, gas, fish and 
forests but its exploitation has long been hampered by natural 
barriers. As the ice melts and new technologies capable of 
enduring the extreme weather conditions of the region have been 
developed, the exploitation of natural resources is rapidly 
growing in the Arctic. The region produces about 10% of the 
world’s oil and 25% of its gas. In addition, a US geological 
survey estimates that up to 25% of the earth’s undiscovered oil 
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and natural gas reserves lay within the region.
8
 It is thus 
presumed that the prominence of the Arctic region as a 
petroleum supplier will increase in the next decade.
9
 In addition 
to oil and gas, the Artic also contains abundant mineral deposits. 
To illustrate, 40% of the global production of palladium and 
12% of cobalt and iron originates from the Arctic region.
10
 
Although Russia clearly accounts for the biggest share in 
resources extraction, other Arctic countries such as Canada, 
Norway and Sweden also have significant mineral reserves 
which have not yet been exploited. All three governments have 
demonstrated clear ambitions to further develop their mining 
industry as part of their respective Arctic economic strategy.
11
 
Therefore, even if there remains much uncertainty with regard to 
the total amount of resources that lay in the region, the 
development of natural resource exploitation in the Arctic will 
intensify in the near future.  
                                                                
8  Kenneth J. Bird, et al, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CIRCUM-ARCTIC 
RESOURCE APPRAISAL: ESTIMATES OF UNDISCOVERED OIL AND GAS NORTH OF 
THE ARCTIC CIRCLE, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY FACT SHEET 2008-3049 (2008), 
available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf.  
The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) has completed an assessment 
of undiscovered conventional oil and gas resources in all areas 
north of the Arctic Circle. Using a geology-based probabilistic 
methodology, the USGS estimated the occurrence of undiscovered 
oil and gas in 33 geologic provinces thought to be prospective for 
petroleum. The sum of the mean estimates for each province 
indicates that 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of 
natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids may 
remain to be found in the Arctic, of which approximately 84% is 
expected to occur in offshore areas. Id. 
9 Lars Lindholt & Solveig Glomstrod , The role of the Arctic in Future 
global Petroleum Supply, Discussion paper , Statistic Norway 30 (2011). See id. 
10 Lars Lindholt, Arctic Natural Resources in a Global Perspective, The 
Economy of the North 27, 30 (Dec. 2006), available at 
http://library.arcticportal.org/1553/1/economies.pdf. 
11 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The High North: Visions and 
Strategies, 133-36 (2011–2012), available at  http://www.regjeringen.no/ 
upload/UD/Vedlegg/Nordomr%C3%A5dene/UD_nordomrodene_innmat
_EN_web.pdf; Sweden’s Strategy for the Arctic Region, Sweden Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 15 (2011), available at http://www.government.se/content/ 
1/c6/16/78/59/3baa039d.pdf; Canadian Minister of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development et al, Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our 
Heritage, Our Future, Can.’s N. Strategy 16 (2009), available at 
http://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/cns/cns.pdf. 
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For international lawyers, the development of natural 
resources is governed by the doctrine of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources (hereinafter PSNR).
12
 This doctrine, as it 
is generally understood, provides that every State has the 
inalienable right “freely to dispose of its natural wealth and 
resources in accordance with its national interests, and on respect 
for the economic independence of States.” 13  Every State 
therefore possesses sovereign rights over natural resources 
located within the boundaries of its territory. 
Although there remains some areas of contention, all 
terrestrial boundaries and most of the maritime boundaries have 
been delimited in the Arctic region.
14
 The 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter UNCLOS)
15
, 
which has been ratified by all Arctic States, with the exception of 
the USA, recognizes rules concerning maritime boundaries, 
sovereign rights over natural resources and claims to the outer 
continental shelf. The Convention provides that “the sovereignty 
of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal 
waters.”16 Within its internal waters, States are sovereign and can 
fully apply and enforce their legislation. In the twelve nautical 
miles territorial zone, measured from the baselines, they also 
exercise full sovereignty but all other States have a right to 
innocent passage within this area.
17
 Regarding the development 
of natural resources exploitation, States have also rights over 
resources located within their exclusive economic zone (EEZ), 
which is the area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea 
extending to maximum two hundred nautical miles from the 
                                                                
12 See in particular Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. 
Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1803(XVII) (Dec. 14, 1962) (describing 
the doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural resources). 
13 Id. 
14 Frédéric Lasserre, Continental shelves and maritime boundaries in the 
Arctic: the new cold war will not take place, in WHAT HOLDS THE ARTIC 
TOGETHER? 107, 107-110 (Cécile Pelaudeix, Alain Faure & Robert Griffiths 
eds., 2012). 
15  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for 
signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) 
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
16 UNCLOS, Art. 2. 
17 Id. art. 45. 
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baselines.
18
 While the rights of Arctic States to exploit their 
natural resources within their two hundred nautical miles EEZ is 
largely undisputed, exploitation rights over natural resources 
located beyond this area has not been entirely resolved.
19
 In this 
zone, all depends for the extent of the Arctic continental shelf 
which can exceptionally be extended.
20
 Pursuant to UNCLOS, 
all coastal States must establish the outer limit of the continental 
shelf wherever it extends beyond the limit of two hundred 
nautical miles.
21
 Within this outer area, the Convention gives 
coastal States exploration and exploitation rights with regard to 
natural resources of the seabed and the subsoil.
22
 In order to 
establish the outer limits of its continental shelf, a State has to 
issue an application to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf providing supporting scientific data within 10 
years after the entry into force of UNCLOS for that State.
23
 
Russia and Norway are at the present the only Arctic States that 
have submitted an application to extend their continental shelf.
24
 
For areas where this mechanism does not apply, coastal States 
are entitled to conclude multilateral and bilateral treaties so as to 
delimitate their ownership or jointly develop the resources in 
contention.
25
   
                                                                
18 Id. arts. 56 and 57. 
19 Lasserre, supra note 14, at 110-118. 
20 UNCLOS, supra note 15, art. 76(4). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. art. 77. 
23 Id. art. 4, annex II. 
24 U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Outer Limits 
of the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Baselines: 
Submissions to the Commission: Partial Revised Submission by the Russian 
Federation (Feb. 28, 2013), available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/ 
submissions_files/submission_rus_rev.htm; U.N. Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf, Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 
Nautical Miles from the Baselines: Submissions to the Commission: 
Submission by the Kingdom of Norway (Nov. 27, 2006), available at  
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_nor.htm. 
25 See UNCLOS, supra note 15, arts. 279, 287(1)(a-d); United Nations 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, adopted Apr. 29, 
1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Sep. 10, 1964); United Nations 
Convention on the Continental Shelf, adopted Apr. 29, 1958, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 
(entered into force June 10, 1964). 
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The question of sovereignty in traditional international law is 
thus built around the relationship among States. However, the 
concept of sovereignty also relates to the exercise of powers 
within the State’ borders and then concerns the relationship of 
the States with its peoples. What will be discussed in the next 
part is this governance system through which sovereignty is 
exercised by the State in its relationship with its people. 
 
B. Intrastate Relations and the Implication of Sovereignty for 
Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic  
 
From the perspective of indigenous peoples’ rights, PSNR 
requires the recognition of indigenous peoples’ own 
understandings of their traditional relationship to their lands, 
territories and natural resources, and their own definitions of 
development.
26
 In practice, however, the exercise of sovereignty 
over natural resources in the Arctic does not allow the realisation 
of those objectives. Both at the local and the regional level, 
PSNR remains entrenched in a State-centred model of 
governance that is detrimental to the traditional way of live of 
indigenous peoples living in the region. 
Since the creation of the Arctic Council in 1996, the voices 
of indigenous peoples inhabiting the region have won 
prominence in the conduct of Arctic affairs. As a forum of 
intergovernmental cooperation, the Arctic Council has been 
established to promote cooperation, to coordinate and interact in 
matters relating to environmental protection and sustainable 
development of the Arctic.
27
 The organisation consists of the 
eight Arctic States (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
the Russian Federation, Sweden, and the USA) and six 
permanent participants as well as observers. The permanent 
participants comprise six indigenous organisations representing 
the interests of local communities inhabiting the region. By 
                                                                
26  Commission on Human Rights, Report on the expert seminar on 
Indigenous Peoples’ Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and their 
Relationship to Land presented by Special Rapporteur, Erica-Irene A. Daes, 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2006/3 (2006), ¶  32. 
27 Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, Art. 1, adopted 
Sept. 19, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1382. 
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virtue of their status as permanent participants, indigenous 
peoples have full consultation rights and can contribute to the 
decision making process in respect of issues that fall within the 
mandate of the Council.
28
 Observers to the Arctic Council are 
allowed to attend meetings and to join working groups but 
without consultation powers.
29
 Most of the decisions adopted by 
the Arctic Council are not legally binding. The soft law approach 
of the organization has nevertheless been considered as one of its 
strength. According to Koivurova and Heinämäki, the use of soft 
law contains the seeds of a revolutionary change because the 
adoption of measures is not constrained by the constitutional 
systems of the States. It also provides the possibility for non-
State actors to participate in the decision making process.
30
 It has 
therefore been affirmed that the Arctic Council offers indigenous 
communities a unique platform to influence Arctic affairs. This 
could serve as a new model of participation relevant for other 
regions.
31
 
The full potential of the Arctic model of governance as a 
means to accommodate indigenous voices is nevertheless 
undermined by the fragile position of indigenous representation 
in the Arctic Council. In the decision making process, 
indigenous peoples are merely consulted and have no voting 
rights. In addition, the lack of resources to fund their effective 
participation in the functioning of the Arctic Council 
marginalizes their position when it comes to the governance of 
                                                                
28  Id. at 3 (consisting of the Aleut International Association, Arctic 
Athabaskan Council, Gwich'in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar 
Council, Russian Arctic Indigenous Peoples of the North and the Saami 
Council). 
29 Eighth Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, Arctic Council Rules of 
Procedure, ARTIC COUNCIL, Art. 38, (May 15, 2013), available at http://arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/425-main-documents-
from-kiruna-ministerial-meeting%3Fdownload%3D1781:rules-of-
procedure+&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us. 
30 Timo Koivurova & Leena Heinämäki, The Participation of Indigenous 
Peoples in International Norm-making in the Arctic, 42(2) POLAR RECORD 101, 
103-04 (2006). 
31 Id. at 105.  
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the region.
32
 As the legislative powers remain exclusively in the 
hands of individual member States, the Arctic Council has a 
limited role in natural resource management.
33
 Natural resource 
policies of States are normally driven by commercial interests 
rather than the voice of indigenous peoples.
34
 Often indigenous 
peoples do not benefit from development projects located on 
their lands and they are left to deal with the environmental and 
social damages resulting from such projects.
35
  
Taking the Russian Federation as an example, the 
government emphasized the role of the Arctic region for its 
economic development and unveiled the ambition to transform 
the region into its top strategic priority for natural resource 
exploitation.
36
 The development policies of Russia have, 
however, been criticized because of the adverse impact on 
northern indigenous communities. Industrial activities in western 
Siberia have, for example, resulted in the contamination of 
hunting, fishing and reindeer grounds and the decrease of 
available lands for reindeer herding.
37
 The cumulative impact of 
oil extraction in Arctic Russia also represents a major threat to 
the way of life of indigenous communities. Similar tensions exist 
in Saami territory where the development of hydropower and 
mineral activities sparked conflicts between indigenous 
communities, companies and the governments. In 2013, Saami 
activists have severely opposed the mining plans of the British 
company Beowulf in the region of Jokkmokk in Sweden because 
                                                                
32  Becky Rynor, Indigenous voices ‘marginalized’ at Arctic Council: 
Inuit leaders, IPOLITICS.com, (Nov. 7, 2011) available at 
http://www.ipolitics.ca/ 
2011/11/07/indigenous-voices-marginalized-at-arctic-council-inuit-
leaders/. 
33 Timo Koivurova & David Vander Zwaag, The Arctic Council at 10 
Years: Retrospect and Prospects, 40 U.B.C. L. REV 123,191 (2007). 
34 Rune S. Fjellheim & John B. Henriksen, Oil and Gas Exploitation on 
Arctic Indigenous Peoples’ Territories, Gáldu Čála, J. OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
RTS., Jan. 2006, at 5. 
35 Id. at 13. 
36 Katarzyna Zysk, Russia's Arctic Strategy: Ambitions and Constraints, 
57JOINT FORCE Q. 103, 105 (2010). 
37  Florian Stammler & Bruce C. Forbes, Oil and gas development in 
western Siberia and Timan-Pechora, 2-3 INDIGENOUS AFF.: ARCTIC AND GAS 
DEV. 48, 49-50 (2006). 
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this activity encroaches on their grazing lands and puts pressure 
on their traditional livelihoods.
38
 In Canada, several aboriginal 
groups from Yukon raised concerns about large scale 
development projects and their negative social impact on local 
communities
39
 while in Alberta, local communities protested 
against the exploitation of tar sands on their lands, which 
irrevocably destroys their habitat by polluting the surrounding 
area.
40
  
Considering the negative impact that can result from certain 
development projects on their livelihoods, there is a need to 
reinforce and protect the special cultural, social, spiritual, 
political and economic relationships which indigenous peoples 
have to their lands, territories and natural resources.
41
 The 
protection of this specific relationship must be encompassed 
within the exercise of PSNR. This view is supported by 
contemporary international human rights law.  
 
II. PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES 
FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 
 
While international law reserves a cardinal position to State 
sovereignty in the governance of natural resources, it also 
recognizes a human rights corpus that refers to the peoples’ right 
to self-determination. That right proclaimed in numerous UN 
resolutions
42
 and confirmed in common Article 1 of the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR)
43
 considers peoples as holders of a right to 
                                                                
38  Daniel Bush, Mine dispute intensifies in Arctic Sweden, BARENTS 
OBSERVER (Sep. 30, 2013). 
39  David Roddick, Yukon First Nations and the Alaska highway gas 
pipeline, 2-3 INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS 12, 17-18 (2006). 
40Clint Westman, Assessing the Impacts of Oils and Development on 
Indigenous Peoples in Alberta, Canada, 2-3 INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS 30, 33 (2006). 
41 Rune & Henriksen, supra note 34, at 29. 
42 E.g., UNGA Res. 1514 (XV), at 67, UN Doc. A/RES/1514(XV) (Dec. 
14, 1960); UNGA Res. 1541 (XV), at 29-30, UN Doc. A/Res/1541(XV) (Dec. 
15, 1960); UNGA Res. 2625 (XXV), at 123-24, UN Doc. A/RES/2625(XXV) 
(Oct. 12, 1970). 
43 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 1, adopted 
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) 
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freely participate in the governance of their polity and to decide 
their own economic, social and cultural policies. Common 
Article 1 identically phrased in the two covenants holds that: 
 
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By 
virtue of that right they freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development. 
 
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose 
of their natural wealth and resources without 
prejudice to any obligations arising out of 
international economic co-operation, based upon the 
principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In 
no case may a people be deprived of its own means of 
subsistence.
44
 
 
The early drafts of Article 1 ICCPR recognised that the right 
of peoples to self-determination also included a reference to 
permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources.
45
 
The inclusion of a peoples’ right to PSNR was, however, 
strongly opposed. It was emphasised that the principle “was a 
dangerous concept because it would sanction unwarranted 
expropriation or confiscation of foreign property and would 
subject international agreements and arrangements to unilateral 
renunciation.”46 Consequently, the inclusion of a right of PSNR 
was rejected. States nevertheless agreed on the inclusion of a 
paragraph in Article 1 recognising the right of peoples to freely 
dispose of their natural wealth and resources and their right not 
to be deprived from their means of subsistence.
47
 
Despite its prominence in international law, the right of 
peoples to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources - 
sometimes labelled as economic or natural resource self-
                                                                                
[hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, Art. 1, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 
1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
44 Id.  
45 UNGA, “Annotations on the text of the draft International Covenants 
on Human Rights”, UN Doc. A/2929, para 19(1955). 
46 Id. 
47 Art. 1(2) ICCPR and IESCR. 
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determination -
48
 has been remarkably inconsistent in its 
application.
49
 This may be explained by the conflation of two 
distinct topics: the human right to self-determination and the 
principle of state sovereignty. While in human rights law, the 
beneficiary of PSNR is peoples by virtue of their right to self-
determination, the doctrine of PSNR has evolved towards 
promoting the understanding that control over natural resources 
is reserved for States.
 50
  The assertion that PSNR is an attribute 
of State rather than a right of the peoples is the result of an 
ambiguous phrasing of most documents referring to PSNR in 
international law which underlines the right of peoples and 
nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and 
resources but at the same time confer on States the right to 
exercise sovereignty.
51
 The doctrine of PSNR has evolved over 
the years from a rights-based to a qualified concept 
encompassing duties as well as rights. Those duties are framed 
in the interstate relationship and do not include the obligation of 
the State towards its population.
52
 As a consequence, the 
exercise of PSNR remains purely State-centric and leaves little 
space to define the States duties in such a way as to exercise 
PSNR for the wellbeing of the peoples.
53
  This stands in stark 
contrast with international human rights law which confers on 
                                                                
48  Martin Scheinin, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights Under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Paper prepared for Torkel 
Oppsahls minneseminar, Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, University of 
Oslo, 10 (2004). 
49  Jeremie Gilbert, The right to freely dispose of natural resources: 
utopia or forgotten right? 31-2 NETHERLANDS QUARTERLY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
314, 316 (2013). 
50 Emeka Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty and Peoples’ Ownership of 
Natural Resources in International Law, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 33, 37 
(2006). 
51 See in particular UNGA Res. 1803 (XVII), 14 Dec. 1962. 
52 Nico Schrijver, SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES: BALANCING 
RIGHTS AND DUTIES 311 (1997). 
53  There are only two resolutions mentioning the duty of States to 
exercise sovereignty over natural resources for the wellbeing of peoples: 
UNGA Resolution 1803 (XVII) Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
(14 Dec. 1962) and UNGA Resolution 2692 (XXV) Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources of Developing Countries and Expansion of Domestic 
Sources of Accumulation for Economic Development (11 Dec. 1970). 
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peoples the right to freely dispose of natural resources vis-à-vis 
their State.
54
  
The negative impact of natural resources exploitation and 
concerns regarding the inequitable distribution of resources 
inside State borders, have brought several scholars to defend a 
revitalisation of the right to control natural resources from a 
human rights perspective.
55
 Most advocate for revisiting the 
resource dimension of the right to self-determination as a means 
to more effectively realize human rights.
56
 Either PSNR should 
in this context belong to the peoples rather than the States or the 
right of peoples to freely dispose of their natural resources 
should be revived so as to ensure that when States exercise their 
sovereignty over natural resources it is done with some form of 
accountability towards its people.
57
 The debate consequently 
pushes the right to dispose of natural resources to the intrastate 
level and underlines the necessity to clarify the implication of 
such a right for the duties and responsibility of States.
58
  
The development of indigenous peoples’ rights in 
international law supports the growing understanding that self-
determination includes the right to dispose freely of natural 
resources and imposes certain obligations on States. This view is 
supported by the Human Rights Committee which has referred 
several times to Article 1(2) ICCPR in relation to indigenous 
peoples. In 1999, while addressing the conclusions of the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal peoples in Canada, the Human 
Rights Committee indicated that Article 1(2) includes an 
obligation to ensure a right for indigenous peoples to control 
                                                                
54 Art. 1(2) ICCPR and IESCR. 
55  Alice Farmer, Towards a meaningful rebirth of economic self-
determination: human rights realization in resource-rich countries, 39 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 417, 420-422 (1998); Lillian Aponte 
Miranda, The Role of International Law in Intrastate Natural Resource 
Allocation: Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Peoples-Based Development, 45 
VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 785, 802-806 (2012); 
Duruigbo, supra note 50 and Gilbert supra note 49. 
56 Id. See also Farmer,  supra note 55, at 420-422. 
57 Durigbo, supra note 50, at 37; Gilbert supra note 49, at 314. 
58 Miranda supra note 55, at 810-833 and Commission on Human Rights, 
Indigenous peoples’ permanent sovereignty over natural resources, Final 
report of the Special Rapporteur, Erica-Irene A. Daes, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/30 
13,  ¶ 16 at 7 (2004). 
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their lands and natural resources.
59
 This view of the Committee 
was reiterated in its concluding observations on Norway, 
Sweden and Denmark.
60
 In the case of Norway, the Committee 
encouraged the government to report “on the Saami peoples’ 
right to self-determination under article 1 of the Covenant, 
including paragraph 2 of that article”.61 The reference to Article 
1(2) ICCPR in the context of indigenous peoples confirms the 
interpretation of the right to self-determination as conferring 
natural resources rights to them and a correlative duty on States 
to respect and protect these rights. More recently, the indigenous 
peoples’ right to self-determination has explicitly been 
recognized at the international level with the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
62
 This Declaration develops 
further the indigenous right to control and dispose of their 
natural resources and confirms the shift in emphasis when 
exercising sovereignty over natural resources. It imposes and 
clarifies a State duty to respect, protect, and promote the interests 
of indigenous peoples in natural resources exploitation.
63
  
 
III. PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES 
FROM AN INDIGENOUS RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 
 
A. Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Self-Determination as a 
Means to Reassert their Rights to Own, Use, Control, and 
Develop Natural Resources in the Arctic 
 
On 13 September 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
                                                                
59 Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding observations: Canada’ (7 April 
1999) UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.105, ¶ 8 and Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, ‘Concluding observations: Canada’ UN Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.31, ¶ 18 (10 December 1998). 
60Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Norway, UN 
doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.112 (1999). Concluding Observations on Denmark, UN 
doc. CCPR/CO/70/DNK (2000). Concluding Observations on Sweden, UN doc. 
CCPR/CO/74/SWE (2002). 
61Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Norway, UN doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.112. (1999). 
62 Article 3 of the UNDRIP. 
63 Erica-Irene A. Daes, supra note 58, ¶ 38-40 at 13.  
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(UNDRIP).
64
 Even though it is framed as a resolution of the UN 
General Assembly, it is generally accepted that the Declaration 
(if not all provisions at least some of them) is declaratory of 
customary international law or at least ‘an authoritative 
Statement of norms concerning indigenous peoples on the basis 
of generally applicable human rights principles’. 65 After two 
decades of difficult negotiations, the Declaration finally 
acknowledged that indigenous peoples are, as a group, holders 
of human rights including the right to self-determination.
66
 
Indigenous peoples have thus been able to impose their view 
and Article 3 of the Declaration insists on the right to self-
determination in a language mirroring common Article 1 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights:  
 
Article 3: Indigenous peoples have the right to self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development. 
 
                                                                
64  UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UNGA Res. 
61/295, UN Doc. A/61/L. 67 and Add. 1 (Sept. 13, 2007) (hereinafter 
UNDRIP). 
65 Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light 
of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 41 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1141, 1176 (2008); ALEXANDRA XANTHAKI, INDIGENOUS 
RIGHTS AND UNITED NATIONS STANDARDS: SELF-DETERMINATION, CULTURE 
AND LAND 120 (2007); INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, The Hague 
Conference 2010: the  Rights of Indigenous Peoples Interim Report 2010, at 6 
available at http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1024. See also 
Centre for Minority Rights Development (“CEMIRIDE”) on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v. Kenya (Comm. No. 276/2003), 142.1 I.L.R ¶ 83, 204 
(African Comm’n on Human and Peoples' Rights 2010) (quoting extensively, 
in its first decision on indigenous peoples’ rights, the UN Declaration showing 
that it considers it to possess an opinio juris character). 
66 Special Rapporteur (Jose Martinez Cobo 1986), Final Report on the 
Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, Sub-
Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, ¶ 196, 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.1 197. 
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Other provisions of the Declaration, in particular Articles 4, 
5, 18, 19, 20 and 34, specify and complement this general 
statement. In essence, the references to self-determination in the 
Declaration must be understood as a right to redress past 
marginalization in order to be able to fully exist and develop as a 
distinct group. Indigenous peoples must also be able to fully 
participate in the decision-making process of the larger (State) 
society in which they live but more importantly it is also a right 
to an autonomous exercise of competences deemed necessary to 
protect their economic, social and cultural distinctness.. 
Indigenous self-determination further builds on the broader 
framework of the peoples’ right to self-determination. The 
indigenous claims to self-determination are closely linked to the 
economic aspect or resource dimension of self-determination 
because without control of their traditional lands and natural 
resources, efforts to preserve indigenous distinctness are often 
meaningless. The UNDRIP, therefore, refers to political as well 
as economic self-determination, but contrary to the general 
pronouncements on self-determination the Declaration links it to 
rights over traditional land and resources. This obliges States to 
pay more attention to an aspect that has greatly been neglected in 
the traditional self-determination debate. As already stated above 
despite its codification as a distinct form of self-determination, 
economic self-determination has mainly been approached from a 
State centric perspective erroneously considering the State as the 
right holder rather than the people. From a human rights 
perspective it is peoples who are the right holders and the States 
who are the duty bearers. 
Traditional lands and resources have always been important 
for the survival of indigenous peoples. To quote Martinez Cobo,  
 
[i]t is essential to know and understand the deeply 
spiritual special relationship between indigenous 
peoples and their land as basic to their existence as 
such and to all their beliefs, customs, traditions and 
culture. . . . Their land is not a commodity which can 
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be acquired, but a material element to be enjoyed 
freely.
67
  
 
Therefore ILO Convention No. 169 recognizes a broad 
catalogue of rights going from non-discrimination to specific 
economic, social and cultural rights as well as rights on 
participation, co-management and self-governance.
68
 Also the 
provisions on land rights, which were highly criticized in its 
predecessor Convention 107,
69
 were rephrased to better protect 
indigenous peoples’ demands. Compared to its predecessor, 
Convention No. 169 has been considered a major 
improvement.
70
 
While the right to land and resources are considered essential 
to indigenous peoples and have been recognized in various 
instruments, they remain controversial and the UNDRIP does not 
fully clarify the position of international law in this regard.
71
 The 
negotiations of the land and resources provision of the 
Declaration were extremely difficult and until the very end 
delayed the adoption of the Declaration.
72
 
                                                                
67  Jose Martinez Cobo, Final Report on the Study of the Problem of 
Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, third part: Conclusions, 
Proposals and Recommendations, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8, 26, 
at 197. 
68  ILO Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries, Sept. 5, 1990, 28 I.L.M. 1382 (1989) (hereinafter ILO 
Convention No. 169). See Athnasios Yupsanis, ILO Convention No. 169 
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries1989-
2009: an Overview, 3 NORDIC J. INT’L LAW 79, 433-56 (2010); INTERNATIONAL 
LABOUR ORGANIZATION, INDIGENOUS & TRIBAL PEOPLES’ RIGHTS IN PRACTICE: 
A GUIDE TO ILO CONVENTION NO. 169 (2009). 
69  ALEXANDRA XANTHAKI, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND UNITED NATIONS 
STANDARDS. SELF-DETERMINATION, CULTURE AND LAND 80 (2007) (asserting 
that the outdated land rights provision of Convention No. 107 were one of the 
main reasons why the Convention had to be revised). 
70 Id. at 90.  
71 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, The Hague Convention 2010: the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples Interim Report 2010, at 21. Available at 
http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1024. 
72  Mattias Ahren, The Provisions on Lands, Territories and Natural 
Resources in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: An 
Introduction, in MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK: THE UNITED NATIONS 
DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 205-209 (Claire Charters 
& Rodolfo Stavenhagen eds., 2009). 
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The dependence on lands and resources for indigenous 
peoples’ survival is recognized in the preamble of the 
Declaration (in recital 6) and various provisions specify the 
content of indigenous peoples’ land and resource rights.73 The 
most important provisions of the Declaration are the following: 
 
Article 25: Indigenous peoples have the right to 
maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual 
relationship with their traditionally owned or 
otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters 
and coastal seas and other resources and to uphold 
their responsibilities to future generations in this 
regard. 
 
Article 26: 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the 
lands, territories and resources which they have 
traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or 
acquired.  
 
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, 
develop and control the lands, territories and 
resources that they possess by reason of traditional 
ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as 
well as those which they have otherwise acquired. 
 
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to 
these lands, territories and resources. Such 
recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the 
customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the 
indigenous peoples concerned. 
 
Article 28: 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to 
redress, by means that can include restitution or, 
when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable 
compensation, for the lands, territories and resources 
which they have traditionally owned or otherwise 
occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, 
taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, 
prior and informed consent. 
                                                                
73 Similar but less far-reaching and less detailed provisions are found in 
Arts. 13, 14 and 15 of ILO Convention No. 169. 
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2. Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the 
peoples concerned, compensation shall take the form 
of lands, territories and resources equal in quality, 
size and legal status or of monetary compensation or 
other appropriate redress.
74
 
 
The first of the above cited provisions recognizes the special 
(spiritual) relationship between indigenous peoples and their 
traditional lands. This is arguably a general statement without 
far reaching legal consequences. The two latter provisions are 
more relevant as they stipulate that indigenous peoples have a 
right of ownership over these lands and resources and that they 
consequently have a right to control and decide freely how to 
use and develop them. Ownership should not be construed in its 
traditional Western view of property rights, but more in the 
sense of custody and usufructs of something belonging 
collectively to past, present and future generations.
75
 
The UN has consistently, through its human rights bodies, 
acknowledged that to be effective the indigenous peoples’ right 
to exist as a distinct cultural community must include rights over 
their traditional lands and resources.
76
 For example, in its 
General Recommendation XXIII on indigenous peoples the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
stipulated what follows: 
 
                                                                
74 See UNDRIP, supra note 64. 
75 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, Indigenous Peoples Committee 
Report 27-28 (2012), at. available at http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/ 
draft-committee-reports-sofia-2012.cfm. 
76 See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL 
ORGANIZATION, UNESCO AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: PARTNERSHIP TO 
PROMOTE CULTURAL DIVERSITY (2006); Special Rapporteur of the Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 
Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous People, 1, 34, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7 (by Jose R. Martinez Cabo); Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Working Paper by 
the Chairperson-Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, on the concept of 
“indigenous people”, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2 (June 10, 1996) (by 
Erica-Irene A. Daes). 
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5. The Committee especially calls upon States parties 
to recognize and protect the rights of indigenous 
peoples to own, develop, control and use their 
communal lands, territories and resources and, where 
they have been deprived of their lands and territories 
traditionally owned or otherwise inhabited or used 
without their free and informed consent, to take steps 
to return those lands and territories. Only when this is 
for factual reasons not possible, the right to 
restitution should be substituted by the right to just, 
fair and prompt compensation. Such compensation 
should as far as possible take the form of lands and 
territories.
77
 
 
Although for political and financial reasons the consensus 
around the rights to traditional lands and resources was hard to 
reach, the UNDRIP essentially codifies existing rules on the 
issue. This view, combined with the growing recent State 
practice, has shown that land and resources rights, although not 
fully crystallized, have entered the domain of customary 
international law.
78
  
 
B. Redefining Sovereignty Over Natural Resources 
Through Indigenous Self-Determination: the Case of the 
Saami  
 
Over the past decades, efforts have been made to promote 
new modes of governance for the Arctic. In light of the 
multiplicity in the governance approaches that differ from one 
country to the other, the choice has been made here to analyse 
the recent developments which have occurred in the Nordic 
countries with regard to the accommodation of Saami self-
determination and their rights over land and natural resources.
79
  
                                                                
77  International Human Rights Instruments, Compilation of General 
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted By Human Rights Treaty 
Body, 213, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (May 12, 2003). 
78 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, supra note 75, at 23. 
79 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, The situation of the Sami people in the Sápmi region of 
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It is not the purpose of this article to give a detailed account 
of Saami history. The article will only point to the changes that 
have been introduced in the governance system of the Nordic 
countries following Saami demands to be considered as a 
separate people possessing a right to self-determination as well 
as land and natural resource rights.
80
  
Saami identity is closely linked to their language, culture and 
territory, and the conduct of reindeer herding, fishing and 
hunting form the basis of their traditional livelihood. Thus, lands 
and natural resources are fundamental to the Saami and 
constitute the basis for expressing their self-determination.
81
 The 
preservation of Saami identity and their relationship with their 
traditional lands and natural resources is increasingly threatened. 
Saami communities have long been marginalized both 
economically and culturally by the majority population of the 
State they live in and their rights over land and natural resources 
have also been severely encroached.
82
 Unless lands have been 
acquired for private and individual ownership, the government of 
Norway, Sweden and Finland traditionally held the position that 
land belongs to the State. As a result of the absence of ownership 
over their lands and natural resources, the Saami people have 
lost access and control over significant parts of their territories 
and their traditional livelihood has been deeply eroded.
83
 
During the past three decades, intensive discussions on 
Saami rights took place and relevant changes in relation to Saami 
demands have started to emerge in each of the Nordic 
                                                                                
Norway, Sweden and Finland, UN Doc. A/HRC/18/35/Add.2 (June 6, 2011) 
(by James Anaya) (hereinafter Anaya’s report). 
80 Lars-Anders Bear, The right of self-determination and the case of the 
Saami, in OPERATIONALIZING THE RIGHT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES TO SELF-
DETERMINATION 224 (Pekka Aiko & Martin Scheinin eds., 2000). 
81  The Saami Council, Review of developments pertaining to the 
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
indigenous people: environment, land and sustainable development, UN 
Working Group on Indigenous Population,¶ 9 (1997). 
82 See Anaya’s report, supra note 79, ¶ 46 at 13. 
83 Anaya’s report, supra note 79, ¶ 46 at 13; Oyvind Ravna, Samenes rett 
til land og vann, sett i lys av vekslende oppfatninger om samisk kultur i retts- 
og Historievitenskapene (Sami rights to land and water, in the light of 
changing perceptions about Sami culture in law and history sciences), 
HISTORISK TIDSSKRIFT UNIVERSITETSFORLAGET 189-212 (2011). 
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countries.
84
 The creation of a Saami Parliament in Finland, 
Norway and Sweden has been a fundamental step forward for 
Saami representation and a vehicle for exercising their right to 
self-determination.
85
 It has changed the Saami position in their 
respective country and fostered their international legal standing. 
In addition, all three countries have started to adopt specific 
measures recognizing and protecting Saami rights. The 
Constitutions of the three countries now recognize the Saami 
identity as distinct from the rest of the population.
86
 With respect 
to land and natural resources, all three States have adopted 
legislation to protect the rights of reindeer herders. Due to the 
cultural and economic importance of reindeer herding for the 
Saami, it was fundamental to take measures for protecting this 
activity. The right to reindeer herding has now become an 
exclusive right of the Saami people both in Norway and 
Sweden.
87
 Even though this is not the case for Finland, where 
both Saami and non-Saami are indistinctively allowed to herd 
reindeer, the country has nevertheless recognised important 
consultation rights to the Saami Parliament regarding all matters 
that may affect the Saami status as indigenous peoples.
88
  
However, the road leading toward Saami self-determination 
and control over lands and natural resources remains long. 
Despite the existence of specific arrangements supporting Saami 
rights over land and resources, the level of recognition of Saami 
                                                                
84 Anaya’s report, supra note 79, at 11. 
85 In Finland, the delegation of the Saami affairs, founded in 1973 was 
replaced with the Saami parliament in 1996. In Norway, the Saami parliament 
was founded in 1989 by an act of parliament (1992:1433), it replaced the 
Provincial Saami Council in function since 1953. In Sweden, the Saami 
Parliament was established in 1993. See, e.g., Kristian Myntti, The Nordic 
Saami Parliaments, in OPERATIONALIZING THE RIGHT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
TO SELF-DETERMINATION 203-221 (Pekka Aiko & Martin Scheinin eds., 2000). 
86 See Constitution of Finland, suomen perustuslaki, 2 luku, 17§; see also 
Constitution of Norway, Grl. ¶ 110(a); Constitution of Sweden as amended in  
2011 [Law amending the instrument of government] (Svensk 
författningssamling [SFS] 2010:1408), as a result the Constitution of Sweden 
explicitly recognizes the Saami as a people, as distinguished from a minority 
group, SFS,109 (2011).                                                                                                               
87 Norway, Lov om reindrift 2007-06-15-40 (The Reindeer Herding Act 
of 2007);  Sweden,  Rennäringslag 1971:437 (The Reindeer Husbandry Act of 
1971).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
88 The Saami Parliament Act (974/1995), ¶ 9. 
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rights in all three countries remains insufficient to fully protect 
their livelihood.
89
 In the absence of authority and property rights 
over the lands they have traditionally owned, the Saami lifestyle 
is under pressure from competing activities such as mining, 
forest logging and the building of hydraulic dams.
90
 In a report 
on the situation of the Saami people in the Sápmi region, the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
commented that: 
 
laws and policies in the Nordic States with respect to 
natural resource extraction and development do not 
provide sufficient protections for Saami rights and 
livelihoods, and do not involve Saami people and the 
Saami parliaments sufficiently in the development 
processes. There is often no compensation for loss of 
pasture areas from natural resource extraction or 
other development projects. Additionally, benefit 
sharing opportunities are rare, especially with respect 
to mining and oil and gas development.
91
 
 
With the intensification of development projects targeting 
the exploitation of natural resources in the Arctic, it becomes a 
matter of urgency to recognize and enforce Saami rights over 
land and natural resources. In recent years, two answers have 
been given to address these particular issues: the drafting of the 
cross-border Nordic Saami Convention and the implementation 
of the Finnmark Act in Norway. Considering the progressive 
nature of these developments,
92
 each of them will be shortly 
examined with respect to their capacity for accommodating 
Saami self-determination as well as demands for land and natural 
resources rights. 
The governments of Norway, Sweden and Finland together 
with the Saami communities living in these countries are 
                                                                
89 Anaya’s  report, supra note 79, ¶ 55 at16. 
90 Id. at 15. 
91 Id. at 16. 
92 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The New Developments Regarding the Saami 
Peoples of the North, 16 INT’L J. MINORITY & GROUP RTS 67, 68 (2009). 
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currently negotiating a Draft Saami Convention.
93
 Its objective is 
to affirm and strengthen the rights of Saami “that are necessary 
to secure and develop its language, its culture, livelihoods and 
society, with the smallest possible interference of the national 
borders.” 94  The document recognises the Saami as the 
indigenous people of the three countries and as one people 
residing across international borders.
95
 The Convention has been 
acclaimed particularly because it has been drafted by an equal 
number of representatives from the three Nordic States and the 
three Saami Parliaments.
96
 The recognition of the Saami right to 
self-determination in the document represents a major 
advancement in the field of indigenous peoples’ rights. If 
ratified, the Convention would be the first international treaty 
explicitly recognizing a right to self-determination for 
indigenous peoples. Article 3 of the Convention formulates the 
right in the following way: 
 
As a people, the Saami has the right of self-
determination in accordance with the rules and 
provisions of international law and of this 
Convention. In so far as it follows from these rules 
and provisions, the Saami people has the right to 
determine its own economic, social and cultural 
development and to dispose, to their own benefit, 
over its own natural resources.
97
 
 
This provision draws upon Article 1 ICCPR and IECSR and 
defends the view that the Saami have the same rights to self-
                                                                
93 The Draft Nordic Saami Convention, pmbl., (submitted Nov. 2008) 
[hereinafter Draft Convention]. An unofficial English translation of the 
Convention is available at http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/BLD/Vedlegg_ 
5_d.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2013). For an analysis of the drafting process see 
in particular, Mattias Åhrén, et al., The Nordic Saami Convention: 
International Human Rights, Self-Determination and other Central Provisions, 
3 Gáldu Čála . INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RTS. 1-109 (2007); Nigel Bankes & Timo 
Koivurova, The Proposed Nordic Saami Convention (Hart Publishing, Oxford 
2013). 
94 Draft Convention, supra note 93, art. 1. 
95 Id. at pmbl. 
96 Anaya’s report, supra note 79, ¶ 36, at 10. 
97 Draft Convention, supra note 93, art. 3. 
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determination as other peoples. This includes the right to freely 
dispose of their natural resources. Although the Nordic Saami 
Convention has not yet been adopted, it constitutes a milestone 
on the path towards Saami self-determination. 
In the area of lands and natural resources rights, the efforts 
of Norway to accommodate Saami demands must be 
acknowledged. These efforts culminated in 2005 with the 
Finnmark Act, adopted in the framework of Norway’s 
international commitments under ILO Convention No. 169.
98
 As 
the Convention recognises indigenous ownership and rights over 
traditional land and natural resources, Norway has committed 
itself to reform its governance system in a way that 
accommodates indigenous rights. The Finnmark Act has the 
objective to “facilitate the management of land and natural 
resources in the county of Finnmark . . . for the benefit of the 
residents of the county and particularly as a basis for Saami 
culture.”99 In practice, the implementation of the Act led to the 
decentralisation of authority to the Finnmark Estate in matters 
relating to the administration of land and natural resources of the 
region.
100
 In addition, ownership of lands and natural resources 
located in Finnmark has been transferred to the Finnmark 
Estate.
101
 The body governing the Finnmark Estate is composed 
of six members; three elected by the Finnmark County Council 
and three elected by the Saami Parliament.
102
 Its main function is 
to administer the lands and natural resources of Finnmark in a 
balanced and ecologically sustainable manner while at the same 
time respecting Saami culture.
103
 In order to meet its 
international obligations imposed by Article 14 of the ILO 
Convention, the Finnmark Act has also created the Finnmark 
Commission. Its role is to identify Saami rights to land and 
natural resources in Finnmark, including ownership rights.
104
 To 
                                                                
98 Finnmark Act, Section 3, Act 85 of 17 June 2005 relating to Legal 
Relations and Management of Land and Natural Resources in the County of 
Finnmark (hereafter the Finnmark Act). 
99 Id. ¶ 1. 
100 Finnmark Act, Section 6. 
101 Finnmark Act, Section 49. 
102 Id. ¶ 7. 
103 Id. ¶¶ 1, 6. 
104 Id. ¶ 29. 
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settle issues arising from the Commission investigations, a 
special tribunal has been set up.
105
 All these bodies have as their 
main priority investigation of the historical use of lands and 
resources located in different parts of the Finnmark County and 
to identify, document and recognize existing usufructuary and 
ownership rights on areas previously considered State-owned.
106
 
The work of the Commission should lead to the demarcation of 
Saami lands and to the recognition of their rights to natural 
resources as proclaimed in ILO Convention No. 169 and the 
UNDRIP.
107
  In its first three reports on the identification of land 
and resources rights held by Saami and other peoples in the 
county of Finnmark in 2012-2013,
108
 the Finnmark Commission 
did, however, not conclude on the ownership rights of any Saami 
communities in areas that were under scrutiny. The reports have 
not clarified Saami ownership and use rights at the local level 
and therefore do not provide for more detailed geographic 
definition of legal rights beyond that of the Finnmark Act.
109
 In 
practice, the Finnmark Estates remain therefore the landowner of 
the land and resources located in the county. If the conclusions 
of the Commission are not modified in the following reports, 
Ravna concludes that “the ownership conditions which have 
been established through several hundred years of State 
governance and ownership disposal of the Sámi lands will not 
change appreciably in practice.”110 Thus, serious doubts remain 
as to the compatibility of the Finnmark Act with indigenous 
peoples’ rights. 111  Although, future reports of the Finnmark 
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Commission may clarify the extent of the rights of ownership 
and use of the Saami in their traditional lands, this process 
demonstrates how difficult it is to reform governance systems in 
ways that fully accommodate indigenous rights.  
The adoption of a new mining Act in 2009 has also raised 
some issues regarding Saami rights and the functioning of the 
Finnmark Act in relation to mining activities.
112
 In particular, the 
ILO Committee pointed to the absence of a clear understanding 
as to whether the Finnmark Act provides a model of benefit 
sharing that is respectful of Saami rights.
113
 As the Finnmark 
Estate is currently the landowner of the Finnmark lands, it 
receives the revenues from mining activities and decides how to 
use them. However, there is no certainty on whether the 
mechanisms provided by the Finnmark Act guarantee Saami 
participation in the revenues generated by these development 
projects.
114
 In its conclusion, the ILO Committee supports the 
claim that Saami who are not the landowners of the land 
concerned but who have traditionally used it, should benefit from 
the mining projects. It, however, additionally emphasised that 
there is no single model for benefit sharing under Article 15 of 
the ILO Convention. Appropriate systems have to be established 
on a case by case basis.
115
 These conclusions leave a great deal 
of ambiguity as to the compatibility of the Finnmark Act with 
the ILO Convention.  
The adoption of legislation such as the Finnmark Act or the 
drafting of the Nordic Saami Convention are evidences that 
indigenous peoples’ rights are increasingly taken into account.  
There is a growing understanding that the State has a duty to 
respect and protect indigenous interests in the governance and 
development of natural resources. The integration of indigenous 
peoples’ rights is, however, still in its infancy and needs to be 
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developed more accurately in new policies and legal 
arrangements. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The concept of sovereignty is multifaceted and can be 
approached from different angles. For a traditional international 
lawyer, sovereignty is embedded in the interstate relationship 
and the delimitation of State powers. A human rights lawyer, on 
the other hand, would construe sovereignty in the framework of 
the relationship between the State and its people(s). This article 
defended the human rights perspective by emphasising upon the 
duty of States to protect the rights of indigenous peoples in the 
governance and management of natural resources. In light of the 
growing interest in Arctic resources, there is an urgent need to 
clarify and strengthen the rights of indigenous communities. 
Taking the adverse effect of resource exploitation on indigenous 
peoples in the Arctic, the exercise of sovereignty over natural 
resources cannot solely be approached on the premise of an 
interstate relationship. 
Pursuant to their right of self-determination, indigenous 
peoples have the right to own, use, control and develop their 
lands and natural resources. To implement self-determination, it 
is not sufficient to recognize indigenous autonomy and to create 
independent political institutions. It is crucial to protect their 
interests in the governance and management of natural resources 
so as to ensure that their right to freely dispose of their natural 
resources is also realized. State legislation and measures relating 
to indigenous peoples’ rights to land and natural resources must 
be revisited taking into account international human rights law 
and more specifically the standards provided by the ILO and the 
UNDRIP. There is, however, no one-size-fits-all model of 
governance and management to accommodate indigenous self-
determination and each country must adapt its own legal 
framework so as to take its own context into account. 
In the Nordic countries efforts have been made in recent 
years to more effectively implement indigenous peoples’ rights. 
At the regional level, the role of the Artic Council is 
commendable even though the role played by indigenous 
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communities in it must be strengthened, especially in issues 
relating to the governance of natural resources. Individual 
countries such as Norway have adopted new management 
models for ensuring Saami rights to lands and natural resources 
in the county of Finnmark. However, the exercise of sovereignty 
over natural resources at all levels remains predominantly State-
centric. Consequently, there is a need to invigorate indigenous 
peoples’ rights as a new source of authority for governing and 
managing land and natural resources and to stimulate the 
establishment of new legal arrangements through which 
indigenous rights can flourish. Only then will sovereignty be 
capable to work in tandem with indigenous self-determination 
with the goal to promote a more equitable, peaceful, stable and 
humane world.
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